The representations of the Orient, in Russia as elsewhere, are never insignificant but they partake of complex identity strategies, whose stake exceeds that of the mere knowledge of difference. Every cultural example thus provides a given potential of arguments: China, Persia or India, far from being studied for themselves, bring answers that allow to build or to reformulate national questions. The Orient as a textual universe is thus particularly revealing the degree of ideologization of national narrative. As Russia has set down its belonging to Europe as the main problematics of its national existence, the country is in a difficult position since its discourse on itself is already a negation of the West: how can it find its place in the binary system East-West? Is Asia automatically what Europe is not? How can the Other be thought upon without thinking like the Other? If Russia borrows from the West the idea of its superiority on the Orient, it also finds itself in a state of decentring, an object of orientalism, and keeps denouncing the risk of an intellectual colonization coming from the "Roman-German" world.

This article is devoted to the Eurasianist ideology, which is the main intellectual trend justifying the Russian Empire. It tries to legitimate the empire by arguing the existence of a natural (geographical, historical, religious, ethnic, etc.) entity called Eurasia, which would gather mainly the Slavic and Turkic populations. This article focuses on the early Eurasianism as the main historiographical analysis of the Eurasian space. Indeed, the different post-Soviet neo-Eurasianist movements have not renewed the historical reading done by the founding fathers: they have not offer new argumentations and have taken up and made theirs a simplified version of the historiographical postulates of the first Eurasianists. That is why I chose here to focus on early Eurasianism, considering that it is representative, still today, of the neo-Eurasianist historiography. After quickly presenting the different Eurasianist movements and the context of their birth (I), I will present the key historical moments highlighted in this historiography (II). I will analyse then the specific place occupied by medieval Muscovy under the Mongol domination, which reveals the fundamentally authoritarian expectations of Eurasianism (III).

This Eurasianist ideology can be considered as a relevant example of how human sciences are instrumentalized for the purpose of a specific political objective. It allows us to ponder over the role of the primordialist arguments explaining the historical process of the Russian progression in Asia: using culturalist explanations, it tries to avoid any discussion on the political reality of the tsarist and Soviet regimes, on the relations between centre and periphery, on a comparison with Western colonial experiences. Thus, the increased historical prestige of Genghis Khan's Mongol empire and the positive appreciation of the steppic peoples actually aim at justifying the autocratic postulates of Eurasianism, if not its totalitarian ones. In this paper I will thus argue that Eurasianism is an inherent part of Russian nationalism, and then invites to question the complex links between nation, territory and State in Russia through the issue of the empire.
I. A BRIEF PRESENTATION OF THE DIFFERENT EURASIANIST MOVEMENTS

The Eurasianist ideology developed in the early 1920s inside some Russian intellectual circles that had had to emigrate to the West following the October revolution and the civil war. Its founders came from intellectual circles that were privileged under the former regime and they were relatively young at the time of their emigration. Settled in various European capitals, they very often obtained academic positions in their host countries while continuing to take part in the activities of the diaspora. Thus they played the part of "passers" of political ideas that were in fashion in the West ("the third way", "the conservative revolution") and that they tried to apply on a Russia they could not access any longer.

The Eurasianist movement appeared in Sofia in 1921 but quickly found its centre in Prague with the settlement of its main theoreticians such as geographer and economist Peter N. Savitsky (1895-1968), historian George Vernadsky (1887-1973) and linguist Nikolay S. Troubetzkoy (1890-1938), a professor at the university of Vienna and an eminent member of the Prague Linguistic Circle. Some of the organization’s important figures could also be found in Paris: philosopher and historian of culture Lev Karsavin (1882-1952), musician and music critic Petr Suvchinsky (1882-1985), literary critic Dmitry Svyatopolk-Mirsky (1890-1939?) who was, in fact, living in Great-Britain, but actively took part in the intellectual life of the Parisian circles. The main Eurasianist publishing house was in Berlin, although the most famous members of the movement did not live in Germany.

This so active movement collapsed in the first half of the 1930s after many internal schisms had divided the partisans of a reconciliation with the Stalinist Soviet Union from their opponents, but also because of the general change of atmosphere: the end of the NEP in the Soviet Union and the rise of Nazism in Europe forced to a political radicalization with negative consequences for the complexity of the Eurasianist thinking. This had developed on a fertile soil, benefiting from a unique situation between an intellectually fruitful Russian emigration and the welcoming capacity of the western circles, but to which it did not know how to survive or could not do so. The idea of Eurasia then slowly faded, corresponding, historically, to the birth of the bipolar world of the post-1945. The clash between the superpowers and the cold war left some geopolitical room for only two entities, the "East" and the "West", subsequently joined by the "Third World". The idea of Eurasia then sank under that of the "eastern block" and the Soviet political experiment was enough, in people’s minds, to explain the unification of the peoples of a great space stretching over all Northern Asia and Central Europe.

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However, in the USSR itself, Eurasianism was discreetly propagated by Lev N. Gumilev⁴ (1912-1992) who became, in the 1980s, the prism through which many post-Soviet academics and politicians claimed to adhere to the movement or to take interest in it. Even today, whereas the texts of the founding fathers have been massively re-published, neo-Eurasianists often seem to be more familiar with Gumilev’s vocabulary than with the one elaborated in the exile of the interwar years. The neo-Eurasianism that emerged in Russia in the 1990s is far from representing a unified thought and force and rather offers the image of a heterogeneous constellation torn between personalities with competing ambitions. Nonetheless, it is not limited to institutionalised currents and on the contrary it benefits from the diffuse nature of its culturalist terminology. The strength of neo-Eurasianism lies indeed in its capacity to present itself as a new ideology for the post-bipolar world, based on the "civilisationist" trend and the idea that the new so-called "post-modern" values are emerging.

Its two best-known doctrinaires remain Alexander S. Panarin⁵ (1940-2003) and Alexander G. Dugin⁶ (1962), who both share the same beliefs: the claim that there is a unity of culture and a community of historical destiny shared by the Russians and the peoples of the post-Soviet space, if not by those from a part of Asia; the idea that the geographic centrality of the so-called "Eurasian space" in the old continent implies an unavoidable political reality, that of the empire; the belief in the existence of cultural invariants that would explain the deeper meaning of contemporary political events; the theoretical cult of national diversity but the refusal to grant autonomy to any of the minorities; the rejection of Europe, of the West and of capitalism through the condemnation of the idea of men’s universality and the criticism of the "atlantist" domination, considered as being nefarious for the rest of mankind.

Neo-Eurasianism has also been spreading inside the Turkic-Muslim elites living in the post-Soviet space: it could be found in political parties claiming to draw from Islam as well as from Eurasianism, in the ideological conflicts opposing the different Russian mufjatias about the appropriation of this rhetoric, in the development of discourses on "Euro-Islam" and in the discourses held by many subjects of the Federation (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Altay, Buriatia, Iakoutia-Sakha, Kalmukia, etc.). Eurasianism was then thought on the mode of a "friendship between peoples" and allowed non-native intellectuals and politicians to claim the matrix role of their people in Russia’s becoming. It was also recognized as the official ideology of Nursultan Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan and

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since the early 2000s it has aroused, in Turkey itself, the interest of those who are looking for a new strategy to think out the place of Turkey, its difficulties with the European Union, its desire an increased presence in Central Asia and its mixed feeling of being both in competition and allied with Russia. The references to an entity called Eurasia have thus gone beyond the sole Russian framework to spread mainly among Turkic-Muslim peoples - who were the first concerned by these orientalist discourses – but also, in a less theorized way, throughout the whole post-Soviet space, if not beyond.

II. THE EURASIANIST HISTORIOGRAPHY: HISTORY AGAINST GEOGRAPHY?

Like Slavophilism and Panslavism, which preceded it, Eurasianism claims to be a complete explanation of the world, a Weltanschauung. Its main intellectual founding principles were the denunciation of the "epistemological imperialism" of the West: by applying its own concepts to the rest of the world, Europe would alienate the diversity of civilizations and establish a scale indicating political and economic backwardness. However, Europe would not be in a state of development that all nations should reach but it would be following a specific mode of development, which cannot be reproduced. If the western prism, a historicist one, sees Russia as a backward country, Eurasianists then offer Russia to unlearn the West and to perceive itself geographically: history would be Europe’s mode of expressing its identity, geography the Russian world’s mode of expression. The movement thus aims at ending "the cultural hegemony of the West" by asserting the superiority of the East: "We do not think that there is only one way of being civilized. (...) We are deeply convinced of the contrary and this assertion inspires all our researches".

Eurasianists can thus be distinguished by a willingness to think history differently and to invite Russia to have an ego-centred glance at itself. They question of the traditional division of the national history into three phases, Kievian Russia, Muscovite Russia and Saint-Petersburg’s Russia, while acknowledging the formalization of these three influences, as each is different in nature and has given the country its identity: the Byzantine influence coming from the South, from which Russia only retained Orthodoxy; the influence from the East through the "Tatar rule", which was organically absorbed; the influence from the West through Occident, from which it has only accepted technology and empirical sciences. In order to go beyond the historiographical impasse of this trilogy, the Eurasianists offer to bring into play the territory criterion. This would allow a new dialectic periodization of Russian history, which would be expressed by the notion of "rhythm". This concept, developed by Savitsky and Vernadsky, allows Eurasianism to present its rereading of history in a more theoretical form. This notion also confirms the Eurasianist theory of the nation as a living organism, since it would define the different periods of the country’s being, the different degrees of realization of its essence, more or less accomplished, its different stages of Orientality. "The historical self-consciousness of

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8 Nikitin, V. P., "Chto ya vozrazil by Milyukovu", Evraziiskaya khronika VII, Paris, 1927, p. 36.
the people is largely the awareness of the historical and organic unity of its
topogenesis\textsuperscript{10}. The "heart" of Eurasia would thus be beating in a geographic form, as its history
can territorially be determined, being materialized in the soil. Each historical event thus
finds a place in a much larger whole that exceeds it: it is a matter, for Savitsky, of
drawing a "system-card" of Russian history, of bringing back its essence into a graphic
form. At the centre of these rhythms can be found the dialectic existing between the two
spaces called, in the Eurasianist philosophy, to form a single cultural and political world:
the steppe, the very "flesh" of Eurasia, and the forest, the expression of Slavic Russia.
Russian-Eurasian history would thus be divided into five stages or dialectic rhythms: the
attempts to unify the forest and the steppe (until 972), the struggle between forest and
steppe (972-1238), the victory of steppe over forest (1238-1452), the victory of forest
over steppe (1452-1696). The last stage, that of the unification of forest and steppe, has
no final date. The Russian-Eurasian history is thus the history a double pendulum
movement, forest – steppe, but also unification – division of the territory. "Thanks to the
predominance, either of centrifugal forces, or of centripetal ones, the process of creation
and life of state entities on the Eurasian territory has taken up the nature of a periodical rhythm\textsuperscript{11}.

Each of the five rhythms thus encompasses a unique state, followed by its
division: the first rhythm goes from the Scythian state to several Sarmat and Goth states;
the second from the Hun State to several Avar, Khazar, Bulgarian, Russian et
Petchenegue states; the third from the Mongol state to several genghiskhanid states, the
Golden Hord, the khanat of Djugatai, the Persian and Chinese khanats. Nonetheless, the
fourth rhythm knows only one unique State, imperial Russia, which continued until the
Soviet Union, as both political regimes partook of this one and only rhythm. Savitsky
also expresses some doubts about the durability of this periodical rhythm once the
Eurasian state would be established: would we notice, after the Soviet Union, a new
division of the Eurasian space? Its conclusion no longer aimed at being dialectic but
eschatological: once the fusion between forest and steppe is set up by the State, Eurasia
will have realized its essence insofar as it will have been revealed as such\textsuperscript{12}. History is
thus supposed to know an \textit{end}. The theories on the equality between Russia and the
steppe are thus challenged as soon as the imperial State structure is in question and that is
announced the pre-eminence of the Russians over the peoples of the steppe.

\textbf{Eurasian antiquity and Kievan Rus'}

The remotest eras in Russian history represent for the Eurasianists a seminal
period, which can be theorized and in which Russia did not exist or little so, and was
therefore not in competition with the peoples of the steppe. Eurasianists can thus give the
nomadic world a historiographical primacy without questioning the Russian national
sentiment. The Slavs, who are presented as an element among others in ancient Eurasian
history, are not granted any autonomy: if they did not have a state of their own before the
9\textsuperscript{th} century, it means that they have "entered the composition of other states that were

\textsuperscript{10} Vernadsky, G. V., \textit{Nachertanie russkoi istorii}, Prague, Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{12} Savitsky, P. N., Introduction to Vernadsky, G. V., \textit{Nachertanie russkoi istorii}, op. cit., p. 16.
made up of nomadic peoples coming from Turkic tribes, themselves linked to the Sumerian and Hittite empires. Eurasianists thus meet up the 19th century romantic historiography, which looked into Oriental Antiquities to see the harbinger of a glorious future: by recreating a mythic continuity between the Slavs and the great Oriental civilizations that are considered to be universal and common to the whole continent, Eurasianism legitimates Russian Messianism against a West whose domination would have been but a few-century long "parenthesis".

Yet, the first ambiguities about the Eurasianist rhythms appeared as from the interpretation of the Kievian Rus’, a period of which Eurasianism proposed two differing readings: Vernadsky is the only one who wants to show its Eurasian aspect, since it is closely related to the steppes, while most of the other Eurasianists object to this aspect as an exterior European element to the Eurasian history. These Eurasianists try to deny the fact that Kievian Rus’ is the founding period of the Russian state and to justify its disappearance for endogenous reasons and not because of the Mongol wave. Although recognized as an important Slavic state, it would not have had any legacy to hand down to the Muscovy. "Between the Kievian Rus’ and the Russia we consider nowadays as our homeland, there is only the name Rus’ in common, but their geographic and economic-political content is totally different". Indeed, while Russia-Eurasia would be profoundly earthly and continental, Kievian Rus’ would embody a river and maritime system (the famous "road from the Varangians to the Greeks"). Culturally rooted in Europe, it could have only experienced conflicting relationships with the steppic world, whether with the Khazars, the Bulgars or the Pechenegs. The Kievian political system was also disparaged: its patrician regime and its political parcelling would have been contrary to the Eurasian authoritarianism and centralism. As for the Republics of Novgorod and Pskov, they are rejected because their Hanseatic culture would be too openly inspired by the Western model. With this rejection of Rus’, the Eurasianists do not recognize any historical nationalism regarding Rus’ and turn out to be convinced partisans of the "Norman theory": Kievian Rus’ would be a German-Scandinavian state rather than a Slavic one. However, for Vernadsky, this period turns out to be, in spite of everything, carrying the main Eurasian dynamics, that of the interaction forest-steppe, since its fertile lands are the geographic outcome of the Asian steppe.

Kievian Rus’ thus occupied a place both inside and outside Eurasia. It could not be entirely considered as a European state, strictly speaking, since three of its elements turned out to be constituting the future Russian-Eurasian State: the long acquaintance with the steppe, despite conflicting relationships; the war with the Poles from the 10th century onwards, which signalled the "beginning of a struggle with the Latin West that

13 Vernadsky, G. V., Nachertanie russkoi istorii, op. cit., p. 34.
16 The place of the Scandinavians in the political building of Kievian Rus constitutes one of the most important and one of the longest Russian historiographical quarrels. The partisans of the "Norman theory" are opposite to the historians who refuse to admit a Scandinavian origin to the Riurikides and who play down the major role played by the Varangians in the formation of the first Russian state.
would persist throughout Russian history\textsuperscript{17}, and the conversion of the country to Christianity by Vladimir, confirming the orientality of the Russian culture, due to its Orthodoxy. Eurasianists cannot thus bring to completion their rejection of the Western experiment of the Kievian Rus’ without questioning these three elements. Moreover, by presenting this first Russia as being too European, they could involuntarily legitimize the historical process of division of the Eastern Slavs into several nations. Indeed, although they denied the Russianness of the Ukrainian world and consequently its Eurasian aspect, they laid claim to it on the political level and refuse any thought of independence or even any separatist demand from the Ukrainian and the Belarus, particularly developed in the 1920s: "This cultural schism is but in fact a political fiction. From an historical point of view, it is quite clear that the Ukrainians and Belorussians are a branch from the sole Russian people\textsuperscript{18}.

\textit{The Mongol Empire : Russian, Eurasian, universal}

For many Russian historians since N. M. Karamzin (1766-1826), the explanation of Russia’s "backwardness", when compared to the West, focuses on the suffering born by the Russian land under the Tatar rule. Thanks to its sacrifice, the West was able to develop itself without experiencing the Asian violence but it did not know how to thank Russia for acting as the buffer state between Europe and Asia. Eurasianism thus calls Russians to de-westernize the way they look at this period and it comes down "in favour of a decisive broadening of the framework in which the problems of Russian history are treated\textsuperscript{19}". The Mongols are consequently valued because they modified the geographic horizon of their time, they favoured trade and culture, encouraged political symbiosis between the Orient and the West, started up military, monetary and tax reforms, excelled in the art of war, etc. Eurasianists have described a Mongol society devoid of internal tension, of social divisions, of power struggle and this, thanks to the respect of the gengikhanid legislation, called the Yasa legislation. The Mongol empire thus showed its will for an "ideocratia", i.e. for a power based on philosophical, religious and political founding principles which would depend on an "idea". Genghis Khan’s state would thus have been a different mode of discourse on Russia, embodying two of the main Eurasianist concerns: due to its territorial reality, it expressed the oriental nature of Russia; and due to its ideology, it came to be a political model for the future Eurasian State.

Eurasianism has held on the Mongol Empire a double discourse which throws light on many of its internal ambiguities: if prince Nikolai Trubetzkoy makes it the symbol of cultural relativism, of closure of the civilization on themselves\textsuperscript{20}, the Eurasianist of Mongol origin, E. Khara-Davan, insists on the universal nature of the Mongol model and of its leader Genghis Khan\textsuperscript{21}. The Mongol Empire is thus, as

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\textsuperscript{17} Vernadsky, G. V., \textit{Nachertanie russkoi istorii}, op. cit., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 229.
\end{flushright}
Eurasianism as a whole, both particularist towards Europe and universalist towards the rest of the world. For the theoreticians of the movement, it is the result of its refusal to recognize its power, because of its self-centredness, consequently rejecting all that would not enter the framework of the Roman-German culture. In fact, Genghis Khan supposedly surpassed both Napoleon and Alexander the Great, as his work could not be "measured on the scale of our current civilization". The Mongol Empire would thus shed a different light on the smallness of Europe, the smallness of its horizon, its geographic and spiritual smallness but also its historical one: the long period of world history would give an advantage to the steppe, to the Orient, against a Western world whose domination would be short-lived. "The history of the nomads is the great link unifying the destinies of the old world! And it is my firm belief that it is the sign of the future!"

The Eurasianist conception of world history has focused on the idea of an opposition between two universal apprehensions of man, two absolutes, those of the "West" and the "East". The key centres of the world could thus only be those that intrinsically possess this double nature, which evidences both their universality and durability. "The role of Rome and Byzantium were to unite the cultures of the West and the East, the agricultural and maritime culture and the nomadic culture of the steppe, and this role, in the early 13th century, after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, went to the Mongol Empire. The latter then carried on the tradition of universality of the first and second Romes, but to its own advantage: the central role played by the old continent is no longer represented by the sedentary cultures of the Mediterranean but by the nomadic world of the steppes. This prestigious filiation will be, afterwards, possibly recovered by Russia itself, an inheritor of the Mongols. Eurasianists take over the myth of Moscow as the third Rome while they shift the emphasis: besides the religious filiation between Constantinople and Moscow, there is a geographic and territorial filiation between Byzantium, the Mongols and Moscow that would give Russia its messianism.

The Mongol Empire also embodies several ideological postulates of the Eurasianist movement. It is for example presented as a religious model, not only because of its well-known tolerance, but also because of its refusal to separate the spiritual and temporal spheres. Eurasianists indeed insist on the importance of the spiritual, and not of economics or politics, in Genghis Khan’s imperial will: an "interior voice" would have made him know that he was one of the gods’ blessed chosen people. His Empire would consequently be conceived as an instrument of eternal Heaven destined to set up order in the whole universe: the conquest of the world was an "obligation" for the great khan and universal peace was his final goal. The Mongol Empire would thus embody the will for a "fair" government in the first meaning of the word, that is to say driven by a religious and ethic ideal. "Genghis Khan’s ideal was to create a single kingdom for mankind. This kingdom would even answer to a "moral demand", inviting the peoples from Eurasia to interior knowledge [samopoznanie], one of the leitmotifs of Eurasianism. The

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22 Ibid., p. 12.
26 Khara-Davan, E., Chingis-Khan kak polkovodets i ego nasledie, op. cit., p. 142.
27 Ibid., p. 55.
The genghiskhanid myth thus legitimizes Russian messianism by explaining that its territorial expansion would come to existence on behalf of universal moral ideals. It offers Eurasianist a unitarian reading, if not to say a "total" one, of the world: the absolute control of the land would represent only the territorialization of a society without any internal division that foreshadows the Soviet Union as well as the future Eurasia. "I still consider our great and severe father Genghis Khan as the greatest figures on the all history of the pre-leninist Eurasia. Only Lenin outdid him by his dimension and the strength of his goal".

The Romanovs' reign: the colonization of Russia by the West or the realization of the Russian expansion in Asia?

Eurasianists have very little published on the three centuries of the Romanov dynasty (17th-19th centuries), apart from studies in legal history by young Vernadsky. To be sure, Russia's imperial era represents a difficult moment in the Eurasianist historiography: rejected for its European ideology, it is nonetheless presented as the "rhythm" of unification of the forest and the steppe, the last stage in the Eurasian dialectics. Then, how could the USSR and the future Eurasian state belong to the same "rhythm" as the tsarist empire, a symbol of Europeanism, responsible of the cultural dichotomy of the nation? How can the tsarist empire signal all at once the end of the Russian organicity and the realization of the Eurasian expansion?

For the Eurasianists, Europe is the "tyrant of the Enlightenment": the non-European nations are colonized from within, the western concepts distorting their own identity discourses. This Europeanization is not homogeneous: the generation gap is widening, the denationalization has mainly affected the higher levels and the elites of the country, depriving the masses from a possibility to grasp the new criteria that is imposed upon them. This loss of national homogeneity, which facilitates the constitution of social classes having no relationship with each other, would mark the intellectual victory of Europe. Thus, the 18 and 19th centuries would have seen, in Russia, the aggravation of the national pitfall opposing the nobility, which has become alien, to its own people. The imperial period is thus the symbol of a "spiritual and moral depravation, the loss of the old faith and the disappearance, in the ruling circles, of the Eurasian historical instinct". The tsarist foreign policy is also criticized: the aggressive panslavism, the russification of Poland, the bad image of Russia in the Muslim world, the division of the Orient into spheres of influence with Great Britain, numerous wars with the Ottoman Empire, etc. "Only the European ideas pleased the [Romanov] government: imperialism, militarism, warlike chauvinism and exploitative capitalism."

As a result, Romanov Russia would embody a "positivist" comprehension of the Empire: with this word, they differentiate between the organic empire that Russia was before Peter I from the politically artificial and economically exploitative colonialism.

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28 Letter from P. N. Savitsky to L. N. Gumilev dated from June 1959, Fonds P. N. Savitsky, Slavic Library, Prague.

29 See for example Vernadsky, G. V., Ocherk istorii prava russkogo gosudarstva, Prague, 1924, or Gosudarstvennaya ustavnyaya gramota Rossii 2000 goda. Istoricheskoyuridicheskii ocherk, Prague, 1925.

30 Vernadsky, G. V., Nachertanie russkoi istorii, op. cit., p. 19.

that would be specific to Europe and the Romanov. According to them, the "positivist" empire thinks it is enough to materially control territories in order to integrate them, while the organic empire claims to be the expression of a deep and hidden reality. Russia, being colonized from the inside by the western thought, would thus not have been able to notice how much "its uncomplicated extension, insofar as it was organic, in Asia, [should have] increased its own being." Peter I and his successors then bear, for the Eurasianists, a triple responsibility: they negated the traditional Russian culture based on faith; they artificially opposed Russians and Turks by pretending the former were the colonizers of the latter; they remained unaware of the permeability of Russia to Asia and made artificial the nonetheless natural expansion into the Orient. Thus, the Europeanization of Russia would have paradoxically served its Eurasian expansion. "At the time of Peter I, the orientation towards the West really gave Russia new possibilities for the realization of its natural power." As such, the imperial period constitutes the most ambiguous rhythm of the Eurasianist historical theory: it is the only historical moment when the "idea" which each era carries, according to the Eurasianists, no longer corresponds to the geographic reality. This dichotomy challenged the postulate according to which a territory gives a concrete expression to an ideology. "Whether Russia wants it or not, it remains the curator of this [Mongol] legacy and all its historical destiny is defined by this. (...) Even at the time of the antinational monarchy, Russia, by force of circumstance [underlined by M.L.], was forced to continue the historical action of the state unification of Eurasia, the action of Genghis Khan: the integration of Crimea, Caucasus, the Caspian zone and Turkestan, the strengthening of Russia in oriental Siberia." Eurasianist historiography does not know how to solve its internal contradictions: how can the rationalist and materialistic knowledge of the West have been necessary to the realization of Russia’s oriental identity? How can Romanovs' colonialism involuntarily, and almost reluctantly, achieve Russia’s deeper essence, which is Eurasian?

III. MEDIEVAL MUSCOVY, A SYNTHESIS OF THE AUTOCRATIC POSTULATES OF EURASIANISM

For the Eurasianist historiography, the Mongol domination hit Russia at a crucial time, when was taking shape what would become the specificity — to them, the decadence — of the West: bourgeois liberties, medieval guilds and free towns, the first counterweights between the nobility and the king, and the beginning of a secularized civil society. According to them, the Russian state has never known such an evolution: its political organization remains stamped by the nomadic legacy, the importance of each social group being determined by its relationship to the State and not by the ownership of the land. If Russia has no European-like State, that is because it does not share its faith: whereas western history would be the history of a constant wavering between

34 Trubetzkoj, N. S., "Nasledie Chingis-Khana: vzglyad na russkuyu istoriyu ne s Zapada, a s Vostoka", Istorinya, kul'tura, yazyk, op. cit., p. 261.
secularization and clericalism, Russian history would be marked by the mutual submission of religion and politics, the "symphony of powers" inherited from Byzantinism. For the Eurasianists, the Mongol period should not be considered as a blank page in the history of Russia but as the founding period in an autonomous Russian culture: Muscovy was born of the Mongol empire as of the "mother’s womb" for "without the Tatar period, there would have been no Russia". The political, religious and cultural specificities of Russia would thus come directly from the Tatar yoke. To justify this iconoclastic reading of Russian history, Eurasianists propose to demonstrate that the traditional opposition between Muscovy and the Golden Horde is distorted in its very principle: these two entities in fact constituted a single State. "The Golden Horde was called to become not a purely Russian State but a Russian-Mongol one, as there were Chinese-Mongol, Persian-Mongol’s states. (...) If the Mongol khans had converted to Orthodoxy, it is probably not Moscow but Sarai which would have become the spiritual and cultural centre of the Russian land. Muscovy would indeed have borrowed to the Mongols their administrative system, their military techniques, their criminal law, their commercial networks, certain linguistic terms as well as, mainly, their conception of the State and their politico-religious culture.

As a consequence, there would have been a process by which Russia nationalized and interiorized the Tatar-Mongol specificities. "At the same time as the Russification of the Turanians there was the Turanization of the Russians, and from the organic fusion of these two elements was born a new totality, the Russian national type". As such, the character of Alexander Nevsky (1219-1263), to whom Eurasianists regularly refer, would embody the appropriateness of the Russian identity choice between the West and the orient. Indeed, Alexander Nevsky made the choice of fighting against the Latin West and to submit to the Tatar Orient, thus made safeguarding the very faith and essence of Russia. "Alexander saw in the Mongols (...) a strength which could help him to preserve and to strengthen the Russian cultural specificity against the Latin West". By preventing Novgorod, Pskov and Tver from falling into catholic enemy hands, by fighting mercilessly Europe, he would have enabled Orthodoxy to survive, because "the Mongols were bringing the slavery of the body and not of the soul [while] the Latin world threatened to alter the very soul". The Mongol rule is thus not only rehabilitated as a moment worthy of memory: it is wished and welcomed since it alone would have given Russia a solid identity foundation against the Latin world.

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36 On this religious topic, see the very anti-Catholic volume edited by the Eurasianists, Rossiya i latinstvo, Berlin, s. e., 1923, 218 p.
37 Khara-Davan, E., Chingis-Khan kak polkovodets i ego naslednie, op. cit., p. 3.
38 Savitsky, P. N., Šestina sveta. Rusko jako zemepisný a historický celek, Prague, Melantrich, s.d., p. 137.
40 Trubetzkoy, N. S., "Nasledie Chingis-Khana: vzglyad na russkuyu istoriyu ne s Zapada, a s Vostoka", Istoriya, kul'tura, yazyk, op. cit., p. 248.
43 Ibid., p. 326.
If Muscovy constituted itself a new entity by its acculturation with the Tatar world, it must embody, on the national level, the Mongol state continuity. The whole Russian history, that of its progress in the Orient, thus confirms the Eurasianists in their reading of Russia as the successor of the genghiskhanid kingdom. Therefore, the conquest of Siberia, particularly swift as the sea of Okhotsk was reached as early as 1643, would not have been a mere political choice but a genuine popular movement Eastward\(^{44}\). The conquest of the Caucasian and Central-Asian world, which happened later on, has also been presented without any kind of reference to the acts of violence and the wars: Eurasianism extols the voluntary incorporation to Russia of the Kazakhs in the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century, of Georgia in 1801 and of Turkestan at the end of the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century. Russia can thus be presented as the only heir of the khans, the prolonger of the work of Genghis Khan and Timur, the unifier of the cultures of the old continent: as soon as Ivan IV declared himself "the sovereign and protector of the Muslim Orient\(^{45}\)\), Moscow spread much more easily eastward than westward, where it had to cope with Lithuania, then with Poland and the Ottoman empire.

The Tatar rule did not bring Russia only its imperial vocation, but also a specific conception of religion: for the Eurasianists, the Mongol yoke crystallized a certain Russian version of orthodoxy, which would have become a Turanian faith. "This religiosity as it is, since it has nourished and still nourishes the spiritual life that has been created precisely at the Tatar period\(^{46}\). The Tatars would have indeed allowed Russia to set up its own identity balance: between 1450 and 1550, Muscovy managed to set up a remarkably coherent cultural system which filled the gap between the people and the Greek-Byzantine culture of the elite. Only Muscovy under the Mongol domination would have put an end to the cultural dichotomy that had characterized the Kievian Rus’ and which would tear up Tsarist Russia. "The period of the Tatar domination was a period of strengthening and deepening of the Orthodox consciousness of the Russian people\(^{47}\)."

Although the Mongols are celebrated for the religious neutrality of their shamanism, it is Islam which is considered as the major element of the Russian-steppic religious fusion. "This acquisition [of the khanats] strongly unified the two peoples, since with the Tatars, close to us by the mind, Islam, understood in its ethnographic genre, had become a religion of everyday life\(^{48}\). What Eurasianists imply with the terminology of "everyday religion" or of "ethnographic religion" is the idea of a fusion between the way of life, faith, culture and state ideals, which would form but one whole preserving the irreducible originality of the nation. Being Russian would thus be a complete, homogeneous way of living, cultivating the sacralization of daily rituals such as a daily confession of one’s faith like the old believers claimed it during the Schism in the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) century. "Russia lived a daily confession of its faith: the everyday life turns out to be the form of the Russian religiosity, the true vision of God, and the Church has relied on it."\(^{49}\)

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\(^{44}\) Vernadsky, G. V., "Protiv solnca. Rasprostranenie russkogo gosudarstva k Vostoku", \textit{Russkaya mysl'}, no. 1, 1914, p. 4.

\(^{45}\) Vernadsky, G. V., \textit{Nachertanie russkoi istorii}, op. cit., p. 137.

\(^{46}\) Savitsky, P. N., \textit{Šestina sveta. Rusko jako zemepisný a historický celek}, op. cit., p. 139.


\(^{49}\) Suvchinski, P. P., "Inobytie russkoi religioznosti", \textit{Evraziiskii vremennik} III, Berlin, 1923, p. 82.
Muscovy has thus embodied all the Eurasianist expectations: it is the model to follow for the future Eurasian state since it was able to put an end to the European elements present in the Russian culture and to assume its orientality by admitting that the Mongol domination was the mainspring of its identity. Muscovy also constitutes the major political reference since it symbolizes the ideocratic principle, if not the theocratic principle that the Eurasianists hope and pray for. Indeed, they consider that religion is not a question of personal belief but of collective culture. "A healthy man is a religious man. It is wrong that religion is everyone’s business: in reality religion if the business not only of the individual but of the people. The peoples from Eurasia have always been religious." So that the religious institution and the State would not clash, Eurasianists calls for their constant interaction: religion must be serving the interests of the State while the government must concretely handle the realization of the ideals of the faith. "The people in the Church and the people in the State are not two different beings but a single one." Muscovy thus reveals the theocratic fantasies of the Eurasianists, who have hope in an organicity of the society in which religion and politics would be intrinsically linked.

The omnipotence of the Eurasian State would also be expressed in its refusal of the modern idea of natural rights and social contracts, as well as in its rejection of the principle of equality between men. "That a man may give orders and that others must obey will always remain the inexplicable and irrational regularity of social life." Against to the supposed mechanism of Western political conceptions, Eurasia would propose an organic apprehension of the political connections: the State alone makes society. It thus could not be restricted by the rights of individuals or social groups, which would be a creation of the Roman legal system: "despotism" would well and truly be the natural political system of Russia. Mongols would represent this despotism by setting up a religious pretext to the relationship between domineering and domineered: the State can only be powerful and authoritarian for it has at its disposal a law which is the expression not of human justice, but of divine justice, as was the genghishkhanid jurisdiction. "The healthier the culture or the people, the more different their State due to its authoritarianism and its brutality.

The stateness [gosudarstvennost'] born out of the Mongol experience would allow Russia to think of itself as a State outside the Europeans standards. The cultural synthesis between Mongols and Russians so much extolled in Eurasianist discourses thus has the function of justifying a totalitarian regime. Their allusions to the deeply "Turanian" nature of the political and religious principles of the Russian people have a meaning only if they demonstrate the natural nature of this political choice: "the confession of the faith in everyday life [bytovoe ispovednichestvo], the State ideologies, the material culture, art and religion were inseparable parts of a unique system, a system which was not consciously expressed but which nonetheless could be found in the unconscious and

50 Trubetzkoy, N. S., "Nasledie Chingis-Khana: vzglyad na russkuyu istoriyu ne s Zapada, a s Vostoka", Istoriya, kul’tura, yazyk, op. cit., p. 264.
51 Ibid., p. 265.
which determined everyone’s life and the very being of the national totality: this life style undoubtedly was marked by the Turanian psychic type\textsuperscript{55}.

For the Eurasianists, Russia, by its orthodoxy, fertilized the Tatar yoke by giving to the Mongol stateness the religious and ethic depth it was missing. Medieval Muscovy is thus at the origin of Russian messianism: Russia was, at that time, the realization of the Kingdom of Christ on earth, both an Eurasian historical reality and the meeting place of the divine and the worldly. By answering to all the demands of the future Eurasian state, it would even have the vocation to constitute a universal state of the Christians, the last empire in the world. The state ideals of Muscovy would thus embody the universal Christologic message: Russian society would be constantly expecting the Kingdom of God. "It seemed to all that, on the Russian land, had settled the ideal of truth and love. The Russian land turned out to be an administrator before God, who had given it mercy and bliss. (...) The time when the Holy Russia would win over the sinful Russia, when the government of truth would rule the earth, was coming closer. The power of the Russian tsar had become superterrestrial\textsuperscript{56}.

Through the theme of the Russian-Mongol fusion are thus foreshadowed Eurasianist political principles: power in Russia is strength in the service of faith and reciprocally.

**Conclusion**

Eurasianism has been aiming at an autochthonous definition of Russia in its relationship to the West. Despite its questioning of Asia, it is indeed Europe, and Europe alone, which is also really raising a problem. From this Eurasianist historiography, which one have to consider as a philosophy of history, one will above all bear in mind its willingness to give Russia a universal value as a synthesis of world history, as the inheritor of the empires of the antique Orient, of Byzantium, of the steppes and of oriental Christianity. Thereby, the theories of Eurasianism take place in the tradition of movements that have tried, since Slavophilism in the 1830-1840s, to define how Russia is not Europe but a specific culture. Nonetheless, Eurasianism is deeply innovative since it tried to renew a thinking on identity which had until then been limited either to the acceptance, or to the pure and simple rejection of the West on behalf of the Slavicness of Russia. It has attempted to raise fundamental questions for the identity of the nation: should the Russian, and afterwards the Soviet empire, be compared to the classical western imperialisms, to the mobility of the American "frontier" in the 19th century or to the multinationalism of the Habsburg empire? Is Russia a European state with Asian colonies or a specific Eurasian state? How can one understand the fact that the Tsarist empire, unlike the West, never had a clear colonial doctrine extended to all its dominions? How can the traditional thinking over Russia be overstepped, this thinking being always marked by the terminology of the "backwardness" or by that of the "Slavic soul"? How can the upholding or the return of the empire be wished without falling into tsarist nostalgia?


\textsuperscript{56} Shakhmatov, M., "Gosudarstvo pravdy", Evraziiskii vremennik IV, Berlin, 1925, p. 283.
The position occupied by the Eurasianists in the Russian nationalist spectrum is thus ambiguous for several reasons: in the 1920s as today, they have been accused by some Nationalists of wanting to sacrifice an exhausted Russia to Turkic-Mongol peoples. Russian nationalism is yet multi-faceted and cannot be limited to these ethno-centred and slavophile movements, obsessed with the idea that Russians have dearly paid for their empire and have been stripped by the other Soviet peoples. The tradition of a Russian nationalism faithful to the state structure, whether Tsarist or Soviet, is fully part of the nationalist phenomenon. Moreover, this division of Russian nationalism into two movements, an ethno-centred or an imperial one, is not relevant on the doctrinal level, for all the trends combine in fact the two conceptions. Thus, in spite of their apparent cult of diversity and their calls for multiculturalism, the Eurasianists of the interwar period, just like the post-Soviet neo-Eurasianists, advocate a "Russian Russia", an empire whose linguistic, cultural and religious features remain intrinsically those of the ethnic Russians.

Furthermore, the key point of Eurasianist thought remains the assertion of the "naturalness" of the Eurasian territory and of the obviousness of its political structure. It thus does not know the western embarrassment caused by the claim of an imperial system. For Trubetzkoy, for instance, the Turkic thought is driven by an "aspiration to grow in width": a subtle way, with parallels drawn between ethnography and politics, to legitimize the expansion of the Russian territory since its "horizontal" nature would be organic. Consequently, it is not so much Muscovy which carries on the Mongol empire than the latter which foreshadows imperial Russia. "The quick political downfall of the Turkic-Mongol world after the death of Timur (...) served as a pretext for the passage of the political initiative within Eurasia to the hands of the Russian people." Eurasianism thus reveals once more how its openness to the Turkic-Mongol world is but a new mode of legitimization of the Empire. As V. P. Nikitin candidly asserted, "We are at home in Asia and this is not a mere turn of phrase."

The Eurasianist historiography thus confirms, quite involuntarily, the ambiguities of the relationship that Russia has with the Orient and the difficulty to handle the national diversity of the empire. The movement’s theoreticians couldn’t put an end to their interest for the non-native cultures of the Empire, restricting them to objects and not to actors of the discourse on the nature of the Russian state. They have developed an essentialist thought and have sterilized their arguments by thinking the "West" and the "Orient" as absolutes and not as a relationship. Eurasianists have publicly asserted what the other currents of Russian nationalism have quite often only implied: the refusal to dissociate what is Russian [russkij], Rossian [rossijskij] and Eurasian [evrazijskij]. The interchangeability of the terms precisely allows to justify the empire as something obvious and to avoid having to take a stand on the political reality of the Russian domination. Would thus the historical discourse on the unification of the Russians with the peoples of the steppe only be a culturalist cover to legitimize authoritarian principles, if not totalitarian ones? Geography seems indeed to be used as a scientific argument allowing to call for a political restoration. This exaltation for a Eurasian nation emptied of any civic objective thus signs a willingness to "exit from the political": the focalisation

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58 Vernadsky, G. V., Opyt istorii Evrazii, op. cit., p. 15.
59 Nikitin, V. P., "Iran, Turan i Rossiya", Evraziiskii vremennik V, Berlin, 1927, p. 87.
on the national principle and the promotion of a certain cultural fundamentalism are supposed to indirectly justify the development of authoritarian practices.