Émigré Networks, the National Endowment for Democracy, and American Support to Solidarność

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In November 1989, Solidarność chairman Lech Wałęsa spoke in front of a joint session of the U.S. Congress to express his "gratitude to the American people," saying: "It is they who supported us in the difficult days of martial law and persecution. It is they who sent us aid."[1] Since the 1980s, the exact nature and quantity of this aid to the Solidarność movement has remained a politically charged question steeped in secrecy. Based on records from the AFL-CIO, Polish-American Congress, and the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as interviews with participants on all sides of this support network, this paper explains how much money and material made its way from the United States to Poland and begins to address how it got across borders. While the sources of Solidarność's success in 1989 were primarily domestic, it is difficult to overlook this American support as an essential factor which empowered the opposition and privileging Solidarność's moderate perspective within a growing field of opposition voices during Poland's long struggle from General Wojceich Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law in 1989 to the PZPR's decision to engage in an honest dialogue with Walesa and Solidarność in August 1988. Western support was essential to Poland's democratic opposition during the 1980s in their fight to undermine and ultimately overthrow Communist power in Poland.

While American support was important a close inspection of the distribution network for these funds shows just how uninvolved Americans were in doing more than providing the money for the opposition: those who directly oversaw the transfer of goods and money to the oppositon

[1] "Address by the Honorable Lech Wałęsa, Chairman, Solidarność," *Congressional Record* vol. 136, no. 60, 101st Cong. 1st Sess., H8632-H8635; quoted at H8634.

in Poland were always Poles themselves. The supply networks utilized during the 1980s were not an American creation. Further, taking a broader view the political development of Poland's émigrés during the Cold War, shows that American money and support took advantage of existing connections and trends in the Polish diaspora in the United States and Western Europe. As a new generation of Poles took action in the wake of the declaration of martial law in December 1981, they coalesced around existing pockets of opposition in Western Europe. The pathways for support to Solidarność were an outgrowth of informal, personal, and organic connections made by politically active émigré communities beginning well before the acute political crisis of the 1980s. So, while American efforts to undermine Communist power in Eastern Europe by supporting Solidarność were successful, they only succeeded because of the efforts of non-Americans who had been working to transform their fatherland for at least a generation.

Initial American efforts to support the Polish opposition coalesced just after the Gdańsk agreements were signed at the end of August 1980 and the Independent Free Trade Union Solidarność was recognized as a legitimate and lawful entity by the Polish United Worker's Party (PZPR). While both the Carter and Reagan administration were weary about directly supporting Solidarność in 1980 and 1981 for fear of provoking the PZPR or the Soviet Union, American trade unionists were much less reserved. Less than a week after the Gdańsk agreements were signed, Lane Kirkland and the AFL-CIO General Board announced the creation of the Polish Workers Aid Fund (PWAF), which grew to nearly $250,000 by November 1981.[2]

[2] "Statement on the Polish Workers Aid Fund," dated September 4, 1980, George Meany Memorial Archives (hereafter GMMA), Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1980, Box 45, 45/3. Most of the individual donations are less than $20, with larger donations from individual unions up to $10,000. See: AFL-CIO International

To determine how to spend these funds, the AFL-CIO turned to Solidarność for guidance, sending a delegation from the A. Phillip Randolph Institute to travel to Warsaw and Gdansk to meet with Solidarność representatives in September 1980.[3] With that guidance, AFL-CIO funds distributed prior to December 13, 1981, were used precisely as Solidarność requested: for the mundane matters of office and printing supplies.[4]

When martial law was declared on the night of December 12, 1981, a number of Solidarność members were caught outside of Poland and rather than returning they decided to work for the opposition outside the country. In early July 1982, the newly formed leadership committee for the Solidarność underground sent word that they wanted to create a single office to represent Solidarność abroad.[5] On July 29, the Solidarność Coordinating Office Abroad opened its doors in Brussels under the leadership of Jerzy Milewski, with a mandate to coordinate "effective and wide support for the Union in Poland," cooperate "with trade unions and their international organizations," and coordinate "activities intended to inform the public about the actual conditions faced by ISTU 'Solidarność' in Poland."[6]

Under the guise of this new office, Mirosław Chojecki and Sławomir Czarlewski took charge of providing aid to opposition activists. Chojecki was in Western Europe in December 1981 attending an international book fair, but had a significant history with the Polish opposition. He was involved in organizing student protests in March 1968 and published illegal bulletins for the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow, or KOR) after its formation in

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Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "After Nov. 24 PWAF [Polish Workers Aid Fund]" and "Letters of Contribution from Individuals to the AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund, 1981."

[3] "Report to the ICFTU on visits to Warschau and Gdańsk, 15/9-18/9/1980," undated, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Wałęsa, Lech."

[4] According to internal accounting a total of $152,000 was spent on office supplies and material for Solidarność prior to December 13; see: "Note to Editors," dated June 14, 1982, GMMA, AFL-CIO, Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1937-1995, Box 49, 49/2.

[5] Andrzej Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ 'Solidarność' (1982-1987)," in his *Solidarność Podziemna 1981-1989* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2006), 60-63.

[6] Solidarity International Press Release, dated July 18, 1982, AFL-CIO, unprocessed records, "Solidarność 1982 #2."

1976 in response to the persecution of workers following strikes in Radom and Ursus. In 1977 he founded the underground, independent publishing house NOWa (Niezależną Oficynę Wydawniczą "NOWa"), so he had an intimate understanding of materials needed for independent publishing and became a natural choice to head the Coordinating Office's program for smuggling support back into Poland.

The Coordinating Office had an initial projected annual operating budget of $175,000 for office and start-up expenses and $800,000 for support—"material and equipment (photographic, broadcasting, communications, printing, etc.)"—to the underground. [7] Initially funded primarily by European trade unions, especially a French contribution of 8 million francs ($1 million), [8] Chojecki began meeting with Poles who were allowed to travel to Western Europe and to exchange information and reports about the internal situation for money and goods to be smuggled back in to Poland. For larger items like printing presses Chojecki's preferred method was to dismantle them, disguise them, and send them with the help of sympathetic truck drivers who were delivering a steady stream of humanitarian aid from Western Europe to Poland, primarily through programs administered by the Catholic Church and the Charitable Commission of the Polish Episcopate (Komisja Czarytywna Episkopat Polski, or KCEP). The individual parts would be picked up by opposition activists and reassembled. In addition to printing supplies, Chojecki successfully sent in radios and even an early computer to aid in editing samizdat during the Coordinating Office's first year.[9]

[7] Letter from Jerzy Milewski to Lane Kirkland, dated August 1, 1982, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Milewski, Jerzy." I was unable to locate any records in the AFL-CIO files showing that Kirkland or Kahn sent the requested funds.

[8] According to Idesbald Gooderis, a Belgian scholar who works on European trade unions' support for Solidarność, European unions and international labor organizations in Brussels provided the coordinating office's initial budget. I am deeply indebted to Gooderis for filling in the missing European pieces in my own research. Significant aid from the AFL-CIO to the coordinating office did not materialize until early in 1984 after the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy.

[9] Author's interview with Mirosław Chojecki, December 7, 2007.

While the AFL-CIO and its affiliated international office, the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), were supportive of Milewski's Coordinating Office, they did not make a major financial commitment to Brussels at first. Instead, the AFL-CIO teamed up with a newly formed entity, the Committee in Support of Solidarity (CSS) co-directed by Irena Lasota, to publicize human rights abuses in Poland and to funnel support to those members of the opposition who were not interned. Lasota was born in France in 1945, but returned to Poland with her family shortly after the end of World War II. In the mid-1960s she studied philosophy at Warsaw University where she became active in the underground publishing world as an editor and distributor and worked with Jacek Kuron, who was a central leader of KOR. She played a prominent role in the student riots in Spring 1968 and was jailed for her activities. She left Poland in 1970 and emigrated to the United States where she lived as a student as Temple University and then Columbia University. She maintained her contacts with the political opposition in Poland, providing occasional commentary and information on political activities to the BBC, Radio Free Europe, and number of Polish-language publications in the United States in the 1970s. After the creation of KOR, she worked as a consultant to the AFL-CIO on workers' issues in Poland, as well as organizing an appeal for Polish workers signed by American intellectuals. Together with Eric Chenoweth and Jakub Karpinski, she founded CSS in the days immediately after the declaration of martial law.

This group began working with financial support from the AFL-CIO as well as grants from private groups like the Smith-Richardson Foundation. Initially, Lasota sent parcels to friends in the opposition but not in jail, disguised as care packages. She included censored books and small amounts of cash (in American dollars) hidden in common objects. To aid independent publishers, Lasota purchased containers of Hershey's syrup, emptied the contents, cleaned them,

and refilled them with printing ink. Because there were so many care packages being sent, Lasota assumed that the government could not possible search all incoming mail, ensuring that a fair amount of support made it to their intended destinations.[10] In addition to this basic support, Lasota also utilized AFL-CIO funds to send needed technology through trusted intermediaries in Western Europe, including: audio recorders, cassette recorders, accessory tapes, transistors, short wave radios, two-way radios, mobile antennas, base station antennas, and various printing and communications equipment. These shipments did not much exceed $10,000 between 1982 and 1983.

At the end of 1983, the developing opposition structures gained an important new American ally: the National Endowment for Democracy, directed by Carl Gershman. With this new source of money, American labor significantly increased its direct aid to Solidarność. From 1984 through 1989, the AFL-CIO funneled about $300,000 per year in NED funds through FTUI to Solidarność's Coordinating Office in Brussels, providing about two-thirds of the office's annual operating budget.[11] When Congress appropriated $1 million in additional funds to go to Solidarność in FY 1988 and FY 1989, these funds too, went through FTUI. Once in the hands of Solidarność's Brussels office, American money was dispersed mainly to union structures in Poland for their daily work of organizing, for supporting those who could not work, and for publishing independent news. These shipments were overseen by Chojecki and Czarlewski using the methods they had already perfected. From 1984 through 1989, FTUI also provided about $100,000 per year to former Solidarność member Mirosław Dominczyk—in a program

[10] Author's interview with Irena Lasota, June 19, 2007.

[11] This $300,000 figure is substantiated by research done in Poland based on sources from the Polish underground. According to Andrzej Friszke, in his article "Tymczasowo Komisja Koordynacyjna," the Coordinating office received $200,000 yearly from 1983 to 1984, and then $300,000 for 1985 and 1986. Adrian Karatnycky, director of AFL-CIO's Poland programs from 1984 onward confirmed this funding range when he referred to "our traditional $300,000 allotment to Solidarność from FTUI's unrestricted NED funds." See memo from Adrian Karatnycky to Tom Kahn, "Eastern Europe and the USSR," dated November 29, 1989, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Unprocessed Records, "Adrian Chron 1989."

codenamed "Project Coleslaw"—to smuggle printing materials, communications equipment, and money to regions and local union organizations that the AFL-CIO felt were being underserved by aid directed through Brussels. Dominczyk, a member of Solidarność from Silesia spent his time traveling Western Europe, employing the services of professional smugglers to get aid into Poland.[12]

NED also provided funds for segments of the opposition, which were not directly linked to Solidarność. Beginning in FY 1984, the Institute for Democracy in East European (IDEE, an organization run by Irena Lasota and affiliated with CSS) received grants to support the Consortium of Independent Publishers, which included all the major underground publishing houses. In 1984 she moved her operation from New York to Paris. In total, from 1984 to 1989, IDEE received just over $800,000 in NED funds to support underground publishing in Eastern Europe, with the vast majority of funds going to Poland. While printing equipment and replacement parts were still needed in the second half of the 1980s, the consortium's biggest concerns revolved around gathering money, a problem which Lasota alleviated by sending funds in small increments (usually about $500 to $1,500) to publishers through couriers traveling back and forth from Western Europe.[13]

NED funds also supported Polish émigrés working as publishers in Western Europe. This included the ANEKS publishing house and the *Uncensored Poland News Bulletin* both located in London, as well as various publications produced by the Independent Poland Agency in Lund, Sweden. ANEKS was run by Eugeniusz Smolar, with support from his brother Aleksandr

[12] This brief overview comes from author's interview with Adrian Karatnycky, November 21, 2007. The $100,000 figure also appears in contemporaneous documents, see Memorandum from Adrian Karatnycky to Tom Kahn, "Eastern Europe and the USSR," dated November 28, 1989, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, inactive records, "Adrian Chron 1989." For further information on the project see Arch Puddington, "Surviving the Underground: How American Unions Helps Solidarity Win," *American Educator* (Summer 2005), accessed online at www.aft.org/pubs-reports/american_educator/issues/ summer2005/puddington.htm.

[13] Levels of funding come from NED annual reports, available at their headquarters' library. Other information on IDEE's activities is based on author's interview with Lasota.

Smolar. Aleksandr had been active in the opposition, culminating in a prominent role in the student protest of 1968, after which he spent a year in Prison. Eugeniusz emigrated from Poland in 1970. Aleksandr joined him in 1917, living in various cities in Western Europe while working for ANEKS. Both ANEKS and the Independent Poland Agency, translated and distributed Polish samizdat for a Western audience and produced underground literature that was smuggled into Poland. Between FY 1986 and 1989, ANEKS, *Uncensored Poland News Bulletin,* and the Independent Poland Agency received over $350,000 in NED funds administered by Freedom House and the Polish America Congress Charitable Foundation (PACCF). A small literary journal founded in Paris in December 1982, *Zeszyty Literackie,* benefited from $100,000 in NED grants from FY 1984 to 1989, administered by the International Freedom to Publish Committee, the Aurora Foundation, and the PACCF. *Zeszyty Literackie* was supported by Jerzy Giedroyc and was affiliated with the Dom Literackie located outside Paris, where Giedroyc had overseen the publication of the Polish émigré quarterly *Kultura*. Like *Kultura, Zeszyty Literackie* was published both for the émigré Polish population and to be smuggled back into Poland.[14]

NED also focused funds on a variety of humanitarian and human rights efforts. In addition to two $1 million Congressional allocations which went through NED to the International Rescue Committee to support a Solidarność Social Fund in 1987 and 1989, NED also allocated $90,000 annually to provide material assistance to political prisoners and their families administered through the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences America and then the PACCF. As with PACCF's longstanding private efforts, the purpose of this program was to ship food, clothes, and medicine purchased in the West into Poland via the offices of KCEP; however, as the grant application made clear, "This is not a charitable project but based purely on political

[14] Funding levels come from NED annual reports. Specific information on PACCF activities and grants came from NED grants files located at the Polish American Congress's offices in Washingtion, D.C. I am indebted to Casimir Lenard for making these files available.

considerations. It is a means to provide a kind of insurance to activists in the independent movement against the risk of arrest, imprisonment, or the loss of a job." Therefore, humanitarian shipments sent through KCEP offices in Paris, included hidden amounts of cash sent to offset the fines, loss of employment, and property confiscations that the government favored to punish political activists in the second half of the 1980s.[15] Also in this category of humanitarian projects with a political spin, POLCUL, a private Polish cultural organization founded by Jerzy Boniecki (a wealthy Polish-Australian industrialist), awarded $500 cash prizes to independent publishers, human rights activists, academics, poets, writers, journalists, and actors who were judged to have made important contributions to the opposition. These awards also counteracted the harassment and fines to which activists were subjected.[16]

To further help political activists, NED provided resources to the Polish Legal Defense Fund to subsidize the cost of defending activists. In 1985 and 1986 the Aurora Foundation administered NED grants totaling $120,000 for the Polish Legal Defense Fund to provide legal support to democracy activists on trial. Between FY 1986 and 1989, NED also provided $50,000 to the Polish Helsinki Watch Committee, through a grant administered by PACCF.[17]

As a final category of broad support, NED funded groups working to promote educational, cultural, and scientific activities that were neglected, criminalized, or censored by the Polish state, often referred to as "independent culture." From 1986 to 1989 NED provided

[15] Letter from Al Mazewski to Carl Gershman, dated January 2, 1986, PAC, Books 4, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-50 Polish Video Film." The money was sent through a bank account in Paris held by Coordination Pologne, and administered in Paris by Father Eugeniusz Plater. According to reports over 60% of the sums were used to purchase medicine. For the continuing need for humanitarian aid after the 1986 amnesty, see Letter from Jan Nowak to Carl Gershman, dated January 9, 1987, PAC, Books 4, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-25."

[16] Letter from J. Boniecki (POLCUL) to Myra Lenard re Report on the Distribution of the Grant, dated July 25, 1987, PAC, Books 4, "Grant # 87-181-E-047-17.1 POLCUL." According to the grant report a family of five could live on $500 for about six months, which was sent into Poland by "selected and fully trusted people traveling to Poland." The judges for the awards were a who's who of the émigré community and included Polcul President and editor of *Kultura,* Jerzy Giedroyc; Solidarity activist Mirosław Chojecki; poet and Harvard Professor Stanisław Baranczak; Jan Nowak-Jezioranski; head of ANEKS publishing, Eugeniusz Smolar, and Juliusz Swiecicki.

[17] Ibid.

$100,000 per year (through sub-grants to PACCF) to Oswiaty Kultura Nauk (Education, Culture, Science, or OKN), which was an umbrella group for organizations operating in Poland. Each group published their own weeklies, as well as hard to find or illegal academic books and textbooks. More central to its mission OKN organizations provided "scholarships" to students and academics who were involved in politically sensitive research that were taboo in official circles, like martial law or Polish-Jewish relations surrounding World War II. Money also funded youth programs and the well known "Flying Universities": secret lectures and discussions held in private apartments or churches to teach censored subjects. For artists, money produced plays and theater events, supported music performances, paid for literary contests, and sponsored art exhibits (over forty in 1987 involving more than one-hundred artists). The committees also supported libraries and archives that collected and lent censored literature, as well as projects for recording oral histories.[18] OKN was represented in the West by the philosopher, Oxford professor, and émigré activist Leszek Kołakowski and Jan Piotr Lasota (a Polish physicist who and brother of Irena Lasota who took care of most of the day-to-day work from Paris).[19]

As an offshoot of these cultural and artistic activities, NED provided a total of $170,000 from 1986 to 1989 to produce and distribute videos for redistribution to Poland. The Video Association or ZWID (*Zespoł Wideo*), was also based in Paris and administered by the director Agnieszka Holland (and later Seweryn Blumsztajn).[20] The program funded new films produced in Poland and sent censored films available only in the West. These videos were viewed in small private groups, known as "Flying Home Cinemas." As many as half-a-million Poles already

[18] The information about OKN is compiled from three annual reports from 1986, 1987, and 1988. See the files located in PAC, Books 4, "Grant # 86-181-E-047-25.0 OKNO" and "Grant #87-181-E-047-17.1 OKNO," as well as PAC, NED 89/90, "OKNO 1988."
[19] Author's interview with Jan Piotr Lasota, June 17, 2008.
[20] Agnieszka Holland later became one of Poland's most famous directors who has collaborated with Andrzej Wajda and Krzysztof Kieślowski. She emigrated to France just before martial law was imposed. Her more well known films include *Kobieta Samotna* (A Lonely Woman), *Europa, Europa*, and *Angry Harvest*.

owned video-cassette players, so the main expenses for the program were purchasing clean video cassettes and buying film and video recording and editing equipment to be used by the underground. Both of these commodities could be bought legally in Poland, so NED funds were mainly smuggled into Poland as cash to be used within the country. Videos produced in Poland included recordings of independent theater productions, popular lecture series from the Flying University, interviews with underground leaders, coverage of special events like the Papal pilgrimages of 1979, 1983, and 1987, and documentaries on recent events. Films sent into Poland included banned versions of Holland's films, Andrzej Wajda's films *Man of Marble* and *Man of Iron,* and documentary films on martial law and the state of the opposition movement, created by a Polish émigré group in Paris, Video-Kontakt.[21]

Without complete records from West European nations who were also supporting the opposition through their own governmental organizations, private initiatives, and trade unions it remains difficult to accurately calculate the total sum of money going to the opposition. However, it is safe to assume that, as with the Coordinating Office's budget, American funds accounted for somewhere between half and two-thirds of all money flowing into Poland. Total amounts of NED money going to Poland began at under $500,000 per year in 1984 and grew to just over $900,000 in 1986. Because of increased Congressional interest, Poland received about $1,900,000 in Congressional funds in 1987 and 1988 and just over $3,300,000 in 1989. Overall

[21] The information in this paragraph is culled from various reports from Agnieszka Holland in PAC, Books 4, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-50 Polish Video Film." For a fuller list of titles smuggled into Poland and more detailed information on the activities of the Video Association, see the report by the PZPR's Governing Body for Propaganda and Agitation: Nagrania Video i Magnetowidowe oraz Telewizja Satelitarna w Działalności Propagandowej Przeciwnika Politycznego [Video and Cassette Tape Recordings as well as Satelite Television in the the Political Opposition's Propaganda Activities], dated May 1986, Hoover Institution Archive, Służba Bezpieczeństwa, Box 6, 6:13.

from FY 1984 to FY 1989 NED administered just under $10 million in Congressional funding to promote democracy in Poland.[22]

Overall, the amount of American money provided to Solidarność and other opposition groups is impressive, if not overwhelming. In terms of levels of Congressional funding, $10 million over six years was certainly a minor issue. In comparison, one M-X missile cost $70 million to develop and produce. Moreover, aid for the Polish opposition was fully supported by a bi-partisan coalition of American congressman and was never politically controversial, unlike other NED projects in Western Europe and Latin America. The question remains, however: just how essential this American funding was for the Polish opposition's eventual triumph over the PZPR in August 1989 (when the revolution of 1989 culminated in a longtime Solidarność advisor, Tadeuz Mazowiecki, becaming Poland's first non-Communist prime minister since World War II)?

Contrary to suppositions by "triumphalist" historians, most notably Peter Schweizer and John Lewis Gaddis who tend to credit the United States and Ronald Reagan with the collapse of Communism throughout Eastern Europe 1989, Poland's revolution of 1989 was driven more by internal domestic factors than outside influences. Solidarność was a purely indigenous movement with links to a history of worker's revolts in Poznan in 1956, Gdansk in 1970, and Radom in 1976, not to events or movements beyond Poland's borders.[23] The language and political

[22] This discussion does not include any money, which may or may not have been contributed by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Polish cause. Amounts of support provided by the CIA remain secret; however, from published sources it seems that this conduit may have provided an additional $2 million per year in funding to Solidarnosc and other activists. Because the materials on these possible shipments remain classified, I am not dealing with them in depth here. For a full discussion of probable support from the CIA, see: Gregory Domber, "The Question of American Leadership," Paper Presented at the 40th Annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Reston, VA, June 2008, 47-50.

[23] On the roots of Solidarność, see: M. H. Bernhard, *The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) R. Zuzowski,

philosophy underlying Solidarność's political and opposition activities drew heavily from previous movements (most notably KOR) and from Polish political activists and thinkers, working in a broader European tradition but providing their own unique Polish view on transforming political institutions.[24] The opposition movement also drew much of its symbolism and important support for the Catholic church, which had a Pole, Pope John Paul II, at its head. Finally, domestic pressures created by long-term economic stagnation, a lack of domestic political legitimacy, and the acute fears of a new wave of strikes across Poland in April-May and August 1988 led the PZPR to seek political accommodation with the leadership of Solidarność at secret meetings outside Warsaw in the fall of 1988. In turn the PZPR leadership's commitment to reform and their fear that they might not be able to keep a lid on popular unrest, led the PZPR to seek a power-sharing agreement with the opposition during the Round Table negotiations, opening the way to semi-free elections in June 1989. Given the chance to vote, the Polish public spoke in a singular voice against the PZPR, electing opposition candidates to all but one of the seats in parliament open to them and choosing to cross out the names on a list of prominent Party leaders and reformers (PZPR candidates for whom Walesa actively campaigned) rather than give them tacit support. All of these long-term trends and short-term decisions had more to do with domestic considerations than outside influences.

Nonetheless it is difficult to overlook the importance of American money to the opposition. Important members of the opposition were and are quite open about the essential nature of American money. As Walesa's speech to Congress in 1989 (quoted in the introduction)

Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: The Workers' Defense Committee "KOR" (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), Andrzej Paczkowski, *Strajki, bunty, maifestacje jako 'polska droga' przez socjalism* (Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 2003), and Jane Curry and Luba Fajfe, eds., *Poland's Permanent Revolution* (American University Press, 1995).

[24] For an excellent overview of the intellectual history of the movement, see Barbara Falk, *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003).

makes clear, he was sincerely thankful to the American government for the aid it had provided to Solidarność. As he elaborated: "Today, when I am able to freely address the whole world from this elevated spot, I would like to thank [the American people] with special warmth. It is thanks to them that the word 'Solidarity' soared across borders and reached every corner of the world. Thanks to them the people of Solidarity were never alone."[25] When asked why the United States was important to the Polish opposition, underground publisher and long-time oppositionist Konstanty Gebert simply replied, "Money. We could not have done it on our own."[26] When Chojecki was asked about the importance of American support to Solidarność, he explained that he had a greater voice in the opposition circles operating in Western Europe because he had access to American money.[27] American money augmented, magnified, and amplified the opposition's ability to act, empowering them to do more than would have otherwise been possible. Radios allowed Solidarność activists to communicate quicker than through slower written channels. Smuggled computers made editing and layout work easier. More ink and more printing presses allowed underground publishers to produce more samizdat. More money allowed for more scholarships for independent artists to produce more politically sensitive or subversive theatrical productions.

American financial and political support for Solidarność also almost certainly influenced internal dynamics *within* the opposition. Throughout the 1980s, the democratic opposition movement was by no means monolithic. Some groups that gained substantial followings, like Fighting Solidarity (Solidarność Walcząca) and the Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległy), maintained more radically anti-Communist positions than

[25] "Address by the Honorable Lech Wałęsa, Chairman, Solidarność," *Congressional Record* vol. 136, no. 60, 101st Cong. 1st Sess., H8632-H8635; quoted at H8634.
[26] Author's interview with Konstanty Gebert, August 3, 2006.
[27] Author's interview with Chojecki.

Solidarność, like violently overthrowing the communist system and declaring complete independence from Soviet domination. Groups popular amongst students like Freedom and Peace (Wolność i Pokój) and Orange Alternative (Pomarancza Alternatywa) successfully organized students to protest, but articulated no specific political or democratic platform. By supporting Solidarność and activists closely aligned to their centrist point of view, Western support privileged their perspective within Poland. By sending most of its aid through Solidarność (over 60% of all NED funds for democracy in Poland were allocated directly through Solidarność channels), the United States gave Wałęsa and his colleagues the power of the purse. As Chojecki understood, he had power within opposition circles because he had access to money.[28] As the major recipient of foreign money Solidarność could decide which opposition groups other than their own received foreign support, limiting other opposition activists' ability to push their own, separate agendas.

It is important to recall that Solidarność's survival was by no means pre-ordained in the 1980s. It was common in underground literature from the late 1980s to hear that Solidarność was a dead movement.[29] In fact, the PZPR declared a full and complete amnesty for the few remaining Solidarność activists still in prison at that point, in part because the government no longer felt threatened by them.[30] By providing a financial lifeline, NED and other groups helped to insure Solidarność's survival. When the PZPR was faced with the possibility of a renewed period of domestic upheaval during strikes in spring and summer 1988—sparked on by a new generation of workers that had been radicalized—they looked for a group with enough social

[28] Author's interview with Chojecki.
[29] David Ost *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 207-208.
[30] For a full discussion of Solidarność's weakening position and the PZPR's feelings of security, see Antoni Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja: Rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988-1990* (Kraków: Arcana Historii, 2004), 57-73.

legitimacy to control the workers. In August 1988, in part because of the support they had received from abroad, Lech Walesa's Solidarność was the only choice. Without Western support it is unclear that Solidarność would have survived in such a position of strength to reemerge as a full partner of the PZPR in the revolution of 1989.[31]

One of the most interesting aspects of the American program to support Solidarność was that, while the money came from the U.S. Congress, America maintained very little direct control over how that money was used or made its way into Poland. The NED served as the first layer of burueacracy. The second level of bureaucracy, the grantee organizations listed in NED annual reports—primarily FTUI and the PACCF—did not work directly with the opposition either. These organizations functioned as middlemen who passed money to third layer of organizations working in Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the United States, the sub-grantees: for example, the Coordinating Office, OKN, IDEE, POLCUL, and ANEKS.

Based on reports from the sub-grantee organizations provided to American organizations, an important truth becomes apparent about the groups who directly sent money into Poland: they were almost purely Polish. The money came from America, but once NED funds were dispersed through the grantee organizations to its final sub-grantee destination, the money was in Polish hands. All the operations that NED funded were run by Polish émigrés living in the West, who then sent money and materiel on to their homeland. Whether it was Jerzy Milewski in Brussels; Agnieszka Holland, Jan Piotr Lasota, Seweryn Blumsztajn, Mirek Chojecki, or Jan Lasota in Paris; Eugeniusz Smolar in London; or Irena Lasota in New York and then Paris, all of the

[31] For a full explanation, with full documentation, of the centrality of Western funding to Solidarnosc's political power in 1988 and 1989, see Gregory F. Domber, "Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Transition: The Case of Poland, 1981-1989," *CDDRL Working Papers,* no. 88 (Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Unviersity). Available online at http://cddrl.stanford.edu.

players who oversaw the actual operations to send support to Poland were Poles who had emigrated to the West relatively recently. America acted as a financier, but once the money was out of American hands few if any Americans were directly involved in deciding how it was used. When, why, and how American money was spent was determined by Poles.

This separation between the source of money and the way that Poles spent it was perhaps most apparent in the accounting practices of the final sub-grantee organizations. In the case of support to the Coordinating Office, humanitarian aid, and funds for publishing houses in Western Europe—groups that worked and functioned completely in the West before sending finished products into Poland—they could provide regular lists of exactly how American money was spent and be held accountable. But for groups like OKN, ZWID, or IDEE, which smuggled cash into Poland, activists could not provide details on how the money made its way into Poland or give a full account of how it was used once it arrived. As Jan Piotr Lasota explained to Myra Lenard, the head of the Polish American Congress's Washington office:

> I would like to clear one matter. I am sending dollars to Poland, not zlotys. Sending zlotys from the West is impossible and, forgive my expression, it would make no sense. . . . Also, I cannot supply you with the names of the universities and organizations which are assisted by [OKN]. They are underground institutions, and they are illegal according to communist law. I do not have that kind of information, because just passing such information it would endanger my colleagues. Please note that when [OKN] is helping some 'official organizations' as for example theaters, the information is supersecret since those institutions could face closing up.[32]

In order to keep opposition activities safe, operational information was compartmentalized and only given to people who truly needed to know. The Americans were dealing with underground, illegal institutions, which had to rely on disguised postal packages and unnamed couriers to carry money and material into Poland. Keeping exact financial records, receipts, lists of contacts, or

[32] Letter from J.P. Lasota to Myra Lenard dated February 15, 1987, PAC, Books 4, "Grant # 86-181-E-047-25.0 OKNO."

written records of any kind could jeopardize the safety of those working for the opposition if the records fell into the hands of the security services. When these kind of these records were kept they were not reproduced in the yearly reports for fear that operational information would be compromised.[33]

To provide a loose mechanism for accountability, however, the Polish opposition provided receipts of a kind to their Western donors by communicating through the underground press. Independent publications included a small thank-you section, which listed nondescript names and amounts to acknowledge donations. In the case of large deliveries of money from the West, the underground press used codenames to acknowledge that American funds had made it to their intended destinations. For the Video association the code in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* was "Zebra dz. Wackowi."[34] For OKN the code for money from PACCF was "Gebroch" with "bullion" serving as the name for the independent councils. Shipments received from IPA were acknowledged in the weekly *Solidarność Walcząca.* The specific amounts of money and aid received were also in code. As Jan Lasota explained, "Smaller amounts of foreign currency are sometimes acknowledged with the name of the currency. . . In principle [*Tygodnik Mazowsze*] is trying not to state the name of the currency and amounts of funds which are coming regularly."[35] These small notes in the underground press were then passed to patrons in the West as confirmation that money was reaching the opposition.[36]

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[33] Irena Lasota kept extensive records of who she sent money with, the final destination organization, and the code word that would be printed in the independent press to confirm receipt. I have seen one of these ledgers and am currently in correspondence with Lasota to help her organize and archive her other records and correspondence.
[34] Letter from Agnieszka Holland to Ms. Lenard, dated January 27, 1987, PAC, Books 4, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-50 Polish Video Film."
[35] Letter from J.P. Lasota to Myra Lenard, dated February 15, 1987.
[36] Gebert confirmed this procedure (Author's interview with Gebert). It should also be noted that while the funder and the final grantees did eventually come to an understanding regarding methods to properly report how American money was being spent, the issue of providing accounting for dissident activities was a significant source of tension. Agnieszka Holland summed up this frustration best in a letter to Myra Lenard (see note 34 for source): "First of all I have to clear the situation to you: I have no qualifications to be an accountant or bookkeeper and so far the situation

This system was based on a deep sense of trust between the Polish activists and their American patrons. Officials from NED did visit their grantees in Western Europe to check in and ask questions, but overall the NED was at the mercy of the groups operating smuggling routes into Poland. As Myra Lenard explained to NED in an annual report:

> Although we have experienced a few anxieties, from our sub-grantees, attributed to the complexity of the reporting system we now realize that the "network" works. For all practical purposes we are reconciled with the fact that more detailed information, especially from Poland, is perhaps unreasonable because of security considerations. Understandably, after the ease with which the Polish security forces were able to round up and contain key leaders of Solidarity, many individuals are reluctant to submit great details of their operation.[37]

Over time, the NED and its final grantees learned to trust one another, accepting the limitations of what could be disclosed and what needed to be left unsaid.

The distribution network for support to Poland also reflected long-term trends within the Polish diaspora and Poles' travel habits. While Milewski's Coordinating Office Abroad in Brussels was a new creation placed in Brussels to be close to international trade union organizations, most other activities were centered in Paris and London, two long-term seats of Polish émigré activity. London was, of course, the home of the Polish government-in-exile during World War II, a group that continued to meet and claim legitimacy throughout the 1980s. Dissident activity in Paris was centered around the Instytut Literacki (Literary Institute) in the

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does not give me that opportunity to account for monies spent. I am a film director, lucky enough to be quite busy. . . . I had agreed to represent VIDEO in Poland because: I knew people directing that movement, I trusted them, and wanted to help them. . . . I am only a middleman: I accept money from Brussels and pass it on to Poland through authorized individuals by a prearranged password. Those people, in most cases, inform me whether they are taking the money to Poland or will do the buying here. . . . Truly speaking I, also, was not aware of the necessity of keeping books. Had I known that I would never have agreed to be in charge of the program and in the near future I will find someone to take my place, someone less busy and better oriented."

[37] Final Narrative Report from Myra Lenard to NED, dated July 29, 1987, PAC, Books 4, NED Grant #86-181-E-047-25."

suburb of Maisson-Laffitte. *Kultura,* the premier Polish-language literary journal, was published there by Jerzy Giedroyc and his partners from 1947 to 2000.

Throughout its years outside Paris, *Kultura* worked to translate important Western writers into Polish to keep the home intelligentsia aware of outside trends. Giedroyc also chose to publish many Polish writers, including Czeslaw Milosz and Zbigniew Herbert, whose work was often censured or otherwise unavailable in Warsaw. Depending on the political atmosphere *Kultura* was intermittently available officially in Poland, but in periods when it was banned Giedroyc worked to insure that issues were available through unofficial and underground sources. Instytut Literacki also oversaw the translation into Polish of English language and European books banned by the PZPR and the publication of censured Polish books. So Giedroyc and his colleagues colored their literary endeavors with political subversion.

More importantly, in the late 1970s Instytut Literacki increased its overly political actions to support the cause of persecuted activists. After the founding of KOR, *Kultura* regularly published information about its activities in Poland and meetings of Polish émigrés to call attention to political developments in their homeland.[38] While the organization had accepted private donations into its Kultura Fund to support its publishing activities—including lists of donations in the back of each issue—beginning in June 1976, *Kultura* began to send funds it raised as part of the Kultura Fund back to Poland to support KOR. Beginning in January 1977, Giedroyc created a separate Worker's Defense Fund*,* and began listing donations to it in the back of each issue.[39] When the Movement for Human and Civil Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obawytela, or ROPCiO) was created in March 1977, Kultura began collecting funds

[38] See for example, "Apel na rzecz Robotnikow Polskich (Miedzynarodowy Komiet w Londynie)," "Zbiorka na KOR w New Yorku," and "Francuski Komitet Solidarnosci" in *Kultura* 352-353 (Jan.-Feb. 1977): 162-163.
[39] "Fundusz 'Kultury' na Sprawy Krajowe" *Kultura* 352-353 (Jan.-Feb. 1977), 163. For a list of donations to the Workers Defense Fund, see page 239.

for them as well.[40] After the Polish August of 1980, *Kultura* began to collect funds for striking workers, their families, and the cause of free trade unions, which eventually named Solidarność as the recipient.[41] So, by the time Americans provided money to Solidarność, the Poles had been involved in fund raising for the same causes for quite some time.

In addition, it appears that the preferred method of getting funds from the West to Poland was an inherited, rather than American-inspired skill. Most of the reports back to the PACCF on grant activity refer to "trusted couriers" as the preferred method for sending money to the opposition in Poland. All of the contact people in the West had been active in the Polish opposition before emigrating, so they were already acquainted with some of the people they would meet to trade news of events in Poland and exchange money to be sent back. If the two participants had not been acquainted personally a simple password would be exchanged to insure that it was the right person. To safeguard against any possible confiscation becoming too damaging to the overall effort, each courier was only asked to return to Poland with a relatively small amount of money, usually of about $500.[42]

In the first years after the declaration of martial law, travel to the West was restricted, with the government allowing few people access to their passports. One of the key couriers in this early period was Andrzej Paczkowski, a Polish academic who had lost his good standing with the government because of his involvement with the democratic opposition. Paczkowski, however, was also an avid mountaineer who happened to be the president of the Polish Alpinist Association. His passport was therefore held by Ministry of Sport, a more lenient authority when

[40] "Wplaty na Ruch Obrony Czlowiek i Obywatela," *Kultura* 364-365 (Jan.-Feb. 1978): 239.
[41] "Wplaty na Pomoc dla Strajujacych Robotnikow i ich Rodzin oraz na Wolne Zwiazki Zawodowe," *Kultura* 397 (Oct. 1980): 371.
[42] Author's interview with Chojecki, author's interview with Jan Piotr Lasota, and author's interview with Irena Lasota. Rather than sending in large sums of money at any one time, this network relied on a large number of couriers making frequent trips. This was not the method used by the Coordinating Office abroad, who often preferred to send large shipments of printing materials and other goods at once. In November 1986, one of these large shipments of smuggled goods was caught and publicized as a major victory for the government.

it came to requesting travel for official association functions. Therefore, Paczkowski was allowed to travelled frequently to the West, meeting with Irena Lasota and others all over Western Europe at prearranged café's and public places.[43] When a trusted Pole could not be located, the opposition sometimes worked with sympathetic foreigners. This included many of the truck drivers delivering humanitarian aid to Poland.[44] In one instance, an American political scientist, Dr. Jane Curry was given a disassembled computer prior to a planned trip to Warsaw, and told to drop the parts off at a specific church in Warsaw. Curry smuggled the computer equipment into Poland in her children's luggage and successfully dropped it off as planned.[45] Once travel restrictions were relaxed after martial law was lifted in 1983, it became much easier to find willing couriers to run money back and forth. By 1988 1.6 million Poles were allowed to travel to the West, a record for the Communist period.[46] This change in travel restrictions happily corresponded to increased amounts of American aid being made available.

To a Western ear, this use of couriers and the artful smuggling it required might sound a bit cloak-and-dagger, but small-scale smuggling was a common activity by Poles travelling to the West. After Wladyslaw Gomułka came to power in 1956 and began relaxing the heavy-handed policies of the Stalinist era, Poles began to travel to the West with some frequency. The number of people travelling rose from 14,000 per year in 1956 to 114,000 by 1970 to 695,000 in 1980 and almost triple that by 1988. As Paweł Sowinski has convincingly documented, these travels were a chance to make some extra money by smuggling wares out of Poland to be sold in the West. The income from this would be used to purchase Western goods for resale back in Poland in the grey economy at inflated prices and tidy profits. Goods smuggled out of Poland

[43] Author's interview with Andrzej Paczkowski, December 12, 2007.
[44] Author's interview with Chojecki.
[45] Author's interview with Jane Curry, November 20, 2006.
[46] The Statistical Annual of the Main Statistical Office from 1956-1989; as cited in Paweł Sowinski, „*Ex occidente luxus*. The Poles as Trading Tourists 1956-1970," unpublished paper, 2.

included easy to find items like fox furs, antiques, amber, precious stones, books, documents, Polish vodka and ham. The goods being smuggled back into Poland upon return included zippers, ballpoint pens, synthetic-fiber clothes, nylon stockings, Western foods, blue jeans, and electronic equipment such as radios, watches, calculators, audio and video cassettes.[47] Western currency (particularly dollars), which could be used in PKO Bank stores and Pewex stores to buy Western goods back in Poland were also smuggled into the country. As Sowinski summarizes, Poles became experts at getting small items past customs officers:

> Customs statistics and reports paint a surprisingly colourful and detailed image of the "customs duties war" waged along the Polish frontier. Clothes—especially during the cold season—were simply worn by the smugglers, but in this way only several sweaters, shirts or blouses could be brought in. The contraband was thus concealed in secret caches underneath the ceiling of train carriages, below a seat, behind a washroom wall, in the casing of heating appliances, and under bed linen in the sleeping cars. Customs statistics also recorded more sophisticated attempts: dollars were smuggled in a roast chicken eaten during the check. A Pole travelling to Sweden prudently hid his money in a cake of soap cut open and then pressed together. Small articles, such as precious stones or gold artifacts, were smuggled in a similar manner. Sometimes, the customs officers stripped the travellers and in extreme situations resorted to the assistance of a gynaecologist.[48]

Sailors, coming in and out of the Baltic Ports, where Solidarność had its roots, were also well known offenders of customs rules, smuggling in small and large items. By the 1980s smuggling small amounts of money and a few items was common activity for Poles travelling abroad, again showing that success in the 1980s had deep roots in Polish traditions.

In another interesting connection between pre-existing patterns and later supply networks, émigré groups in London and Paris, as well as other travel destinations for Poles, helped to promote small scale smuggling from the mid-1950s onward by offering censored and hard to find books through a program, which was funded covertly by the Central Intelligence

[47] "Biuletyn Operacyjny" of the Main Customs Office, 1979-1988, Archive of Modern Records, Warsaw, Main Customs Office, 30/78, 25/151, 25/152, 25/153, 25/154, 25/155, 25/156, 25/157, 25/158; as mentioned in ibid., 12.
[48] Ibid.,

Agency and run by a Romanian émigré named George Minden. Minden ran the program under the auspices of Free Europe Press (linked to Radio Free Europe) from Munich, beginning in 1957, and was an extension of Radio Free Europe's well documented balloon program for dropping leaflets behind the iron curtain. Minden brought a bit more nuance to these heavy-handed propaganda exercises by including scientific-technical and cultural works along with the more overtly political material. In 1970, Minden moved to another front company, called the International Advisory Council in New York, which later merged with another group and was called the International Literary Center. Throughout its existence until the early 1990s, the program's primary purpose was to purchase books to be mailed to all areas of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, through contacts with American academics and émigrés in Western Europe. Minden made deals with American publishers as well as publishing houses throughout Western Europe to purchase books at reduced prices and then paid the shipping costs as well.[49]

Shortly after the Polish October and Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the program also began to support what was called a hand-to-hand or person-to-person network for distributing books. It was comprised of "a network of already existing Polish exile cultural institutions, through Western Europe where books were passed to Polish travelers."[50] Books with political and cultural topics, in Polish, English and other languages were given away by the existing book shops free of charge to travelers from the East. Minden's group would then reimburse the book store or distribution point. As Minden made clear in one report, the hand-to-hand distribution of

[49] For an overview of the program, see John P.C. Matthews, "The West's Secret Marshall Plan for the Mind," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16, no. 3 (July 2003): 409-427
[50] ibid., 420.

books was particularly valuable compared to the mailing program "because it allows us to give out highly political books without fear of their seizure by postal censors."[51]

The network was quite extensive for Poland and aimed at areas where Poles were likely to travel. According to an incomplete collection of Minden's papers, this distribution network for Polish travelers had locations in London, Paris, Vienna, Rome, Geneva, and some regional locations in France and England. (There were additional locations for other émigré groups; these sites were all particularly supported for the Polish portion of the program.) In London book distribution locations included: the Polish library, Christian Social Youth Federation, the Polish Hearth, the Veritas Foundation, the Polish Excombattants Association, the editorial offices of Wiadomosc, and the Orbis and Taurus Publishing houses book stores; in Paris they included: the Libella Bookstore, the Galerie Lambert, the Librarie Polonaise, the Biblioteque Polonaise, the editorial offices of *Kultura*, and the Union of Polish Federalists; in Vienna they included the Nansen Haus and the Jungbrunnen Bookstore; in Rome distributors were Esperienze Internazionali and the Polish Ex-combatants Association; and finally in Geneva books could be found at the Polish YMCA.[52] As early as 1970, these fixed distribution centers were augmented by "ad hoc distributions [arranged] by the Institut Literaire . . . to Polish sailors at their ports of call, to Polish vacationers at tourist centers, and to Polish specialists at their works sites in Africa and the Middle East."[53]

The numbers of books distributed to travelers were both quantitatively and qualitatively impressive. To give a sense of the scale of the operation, in 1966 32,215 books were distributed

[51] George Minden, "Book Distribution Report 1970: 2," Hoover Institution Archive at Stanford University, George C. Minden Collection, Box 1, 12.
[52] This list of distribution centers is culled from three reports by Minden, "Book Distribution Report 1966," "Book Distribution Report 1967," "Book Distribution Report 1968," "Book Distribution Report 1969," and "Book Distribution Report 1970: 1," all from Hoover Institution, Minden Collection, Box 1.
[53] "Book Report 1970: 1," Hoover Institution, Minden Collection, Box 1, 16-17.

person-to-person through the Polish network.[54] By 1969, this number had grown to 41,599 books.[55] On a more qualitative level, Minden reports on some of the central figures in the nascent Polish opposition who received books through this network. As he reported at the end of 1967:

> One of our sponsors in Paris reported that Polish visitors to that city had taken 23 books of a political nature on behalf of a group of students and young professors in Warsaw who meet privately for discussions. The group shares the ideas of [Jacek] Kuroń and [Karol] Modzelewski, two young assistant professors at Warsaw University who were thrown out of the party and given prison sentences for their views. The books taken include Drachovitch, "Marxism in the Modern World"; Lichteim, "Marxism, an Historical and Critical Study"; Wolfe, "Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror"; Bromke, "Communist States at the Crossroads"; Kennan, "Power and Elite."[56]

This group included, a young Adam Michnik and many of the other student leaders who played a central role in the student revolt in the spring of 1968 and who would later form the foundation for KOR. In a later report, Minden reported: "During a fall trip to the West Professor Edward Lipinski picked up 14 books in Paris, all published by the antiregime Institut Literaire, and ten more in London." Among other opposition activities, Lipinski was a founding member of KOR less than a decade later.[57] Clearly the program was finding the kind of people it was designed to support.

Most histories of the Polish Revolution in 1989 begin with Solidarność's reemergence as an officially tolerated organization following a complete amnesty in November 1986; however the roots of Solidarność are readily traced through early opposition movements in the 1970s, as well as worker's and student uprisings in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and of course the strikes of 1980. As this paper argues, the successful American effort to support Solidarność, and the democratic

[54] "Book Distribution Report 1966," Hoover Institution, Minden Collection, Box 1, 8.
[55] "Book Distribution Report 1969," Hoover Institution, Minden Collection, Box 1, 14
[56] "Book Distribution Report 1967," Hoover Institution, Minden Collection, Box 1, 9
[57] "Book Distribution Report 1969," Hoover Institution, Minden Collection, Box 1, 4.

opposition in Poland more broadly, has roots going back at least as far. The networks activated by Polish émigrés utilizing American funds in the 1980s, were not new creations. They were pre-existing networks nurtured by Polish émigrés, which drew on a longstanding Polish tradition of small-time smuggling when travelling to the West. Interestingly, the network of book distributors that utilized these small-time smugglers, itself had a longstanding monetary connection to the U.S. government. It is clear from this discussion that the roots of international support to the Solidarność opposition movement go back at least as far as the roots of the Polish opposition, to sometime around the Polish October of 1956. As scholars move forward and continue to contextualize the miraculous events of 1989, they would do well to illuminate the depth of the historical trends, which came to a head in that *annus mirabilis*.

Another important conclusion of this paper is that in studying international influences on (at least) Poland's revolution of 1989, a full picture must move beyond actions undertaken by governments. The supply networks that proved so essential to Solidarność's survival and ultimate triumph were not the work of a single bureaucracy or shadowy government program; instead they were a fascinating kind of public-private or state-private hybrid, with money coming from governments but talent, know-how, and effort coming from private individuals and institutions, in this case non-Americans. The émigré networks and the government programs that partially supported them existed in a mutually beneficial relationship, proving that the call for international historians to include a greater discussion of non-governmental organizations in the practice of diplomacy is well deserved. Finally, as the United States and West European governments continue to promote democracy around the globe (I am thinking here particularly about recent events in Iran) the lessons from Poland in the 1980s show that it is essential to respond to and motivate those émigrés—who have a much better understanding of events within

their own country than foreign governments—with whom the West shares common goals, and to think about change over the long term. Democracy was reborn in Poland in 1989, not because of the policies of one administration or even policies pursued over the final decade of the Cold War. The events that brought an end to the Cold War in 1989 had their roots stretching back into the first decade of the conflict. Policy makers should think with the same acknowledgement of how slowly peaceful change can come to totalitarian regimes.